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Reward the Winners,
Punish the Losers?
Performance Budgeting
Reconsidered
By Dr Miriam Allam Dr Miriam Allam Dr Miriam Allam Dr Miriam Allam Dr Miriam Allam*
The initial objective of performance budgeting is to allocate resources to funding programmes
that deliver results. Performance budgeting therefore explicitly establishes a link between
programme performance information and decision-making. The argument is that performance
information will allow decision-makers to create a consensus on whether the programme is
performing well and whether further funds should be granted. Following this reasoning it should
be simple to “reward the winners and punish the losers” by means of establishing a relationship
between performance and resource allocation. However, the article argues that this relationship
is not as straightforward as it might appear at first glance. Given that the resource allocations
on the basis of programme performance in real-life application pose some severe restrictions,
the paper concludes that the initial objective of performance budgeting has to be reconsidered.
This is not to claim that performance budgeting is without any merits but rather that in
questioning the effectiveness of performance budgeting, it is essential to first ask for its purpose.
If the purpose is not the allocation of resources in accordance to performance but to increase
transparency then performance budgeting is a step into the right direction.
The underlying idea behind performance budgeting is to
allocate resources to programmes and projects that deliver
results.1 Performance budgeting therefore explicitly
establishes a link between programme performance
information and decision-making. The basic assumption is
that more information leads to better decisions.
Performance budgeting and its variants have been on
the agenda of public budget management for the last few
decades. Since the 1990s, it has become a top priority for
budgeting reforms in advanced as well as developing and
transition countries. By 2005, nearly three-quarters of
OECD countries had introduced some sort of performance
information on budgeting and management (Curristine
2005: 108). Performance budgeting in this respect is part
and parcel of the broader public sector reforms (Robinson
and Brumby 2005). These reforms were designed to address
two of the most pressing problems the public sectors face:
firstly, the challenge to improve the quality of public services
and secondly the need to attain fiscal sustainability. Given
that result-based budgeting2 puts emphasis on both
efficiency and efficacy, it is hoped that the new approach to
public budget management would help to ensure
accountability and to overcome the widespread public
disappointment with public sector performance. In addition,
fiscal austerity measures and fiscal consolidation as such
require an efficient spending of limited resources, making
the need to employ performance budgeting systems more
apparent (cf Robinson and Brumby 2005). This is because
performance budgeting is expected to bring the much
needed “productivity dividend, which can be used either to
keep the tax burden down, [...] to fund new service priority”
(Robinson and Brumby 2005: 13) or to consolidate the
aggregate public expenditure (cf Reddick 2002). It is
therefore no surprise that many EU Member States have
justified the introduction of performance-based budgeting
by referring to their legal obligation to avoid excessive
government spending and to adhere to the provisions of
the stability and growth pact.
What is new about performance budgeting? Result-
based budgeting promotes market solutions to problems of
underperforming programmes. It endorses an incentive
and sanction structure with funding rewards for good
performance.3 It therefore stands in harsh contrast to the
traditional approach towards budget management which
focuses on resource allocation and input control with little
analysis of the actual performance of the programme. In
incremental budgeting, policy objectives are usually poorly
articulated and there are no constraints on the quantity and
quality of outputs (Diamond 2003: 4).4 Performance
budgeting, in turn, starts at the performance level and
analyses if the objectives have been met. Performance
budgeting increases flexibility and removes constraints on
resource management. Spending agencies are (ideally)
able to reallocate funds within controls on budget line
items. Thus, organisations and managers have more room
to manoeuvre. In short, performance budgeting has movedwww.eipa.eu
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“from focusing on inputs, and how they are employed, to
focusing on outputs and how they fulfilled the original
budget objectives” (Diamond 2003: 13).
The use of performance-based budgeting for
programme management has several components of which
the operationalisation of performance information is pivotal.
Broadly speaking, performance information should be a)
objective; b) standardised; c) indicative; and d) consistent.
The four core elements of performance-based budgeting
are: the focus on results (outcome), the strategy expressed
in goals (outcome targets) and objectives (output targets),
the output (what is done in order to achieve the outcome)
and the evaluation of the activity by means of performance
indicators.5 Performance indicators can be divided into
three categories: measures
of efficiency (i.e. indicators
measuring the quality of the
service provided), effective-
ness (i.e. indicators measur-
ing whether objectives have
been met) and – with varying
degree of application from
country to country – evalua-
tions (i.e. indicators measur-
ing the satisfaction of cus-
tomers with the results).6 The
argument is that these
indicators will allow decision-
makers to create a consensus on whether the programme
is performing well and whether further funds should be
granted. Following this reasoning it should be simple to
“reward the winners and punish the losers” by means of
establishing a relationship between performance and
resource allocation. However, this relationship is not as
straightforward as it might appear at first glance. Firstly,
performance information has to be interpreted and is
therefore bound to the interpreter’s conceptions, i.e. his/
her understanding about what is right or wrong. Thus,
performance budgeting is patently subjective. Secondly,
legislators are not necessarily changing their behaviour in
accordance with the performance-based scores. Thirdly,
comprehensive performance information may never be
accomplished because it simply lies beyond human cognitive
capacities. Given that the resource allocations on the basis
of programme performance in real-life application pose
some severe restrictions, the paper concludes that the initial
objective of performance budgeting has to be reconsidered.
Interpretation of performance information Interpretation of performance information Interpretation of performance information Interpretation of performance information Interpretation of performance information
Certainly, a lack of information increases uncertainty,
however, as Feldman (1989) correctly points out, this does
not mean that performance information can reduce
ambiguity. Ambiguity is rather inherently linked with the
interpretation of information. Information is always inter-
preted within its political and
economic context; it is a
political and economic
context at a particular time.
Thus, the interpretation of
performance information is
inevitably subject to contest-
ation. In addition, the
interpretation of information
might be influenced by the
interpreters’ causal and
principled beliefs while
information can be used
selectively. Accordingly, the
outcome of the decision-making can be directed towards a
given direction by choosing what information is evaluated
and highlighted. Thus, “rather than present information
comprehensively, giving equal balance to all, actors will
highlight specific pieces of data” (Moynihan 2005: 159).
Certainly, this selection is not immune from political influence
and often reflects the balance of power between the
organisational entities. This is even more so as performance
budgeting can shift the balance of power between the
actors involved. This is because performance budgeting
may well serve as a tool for setting the policy agenda. For
example, depending on the performance budgeting system,
actors have a high degree of freedom to choose goals and
Information is always
interpreted within its
political and economic
context; it is a political and
economic context at a
particular time.
© European Community, 2007
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measures; ergo they have space for manoeuvring and
setting the policy agenda. Moreover, it should be noted that
the interpretation and success of the programme information
depends on the persuasiveness of the arguments made.
The argument, on the other hand, becomes persuasive
when it is seen to solve problems that FIT existing interests.
Thus, the persuasiveness of the performance information is
neither coincidental nor objective. In short, performance
information cannot eliminate subjectivity because
information first needs to be rated and then selected and
interpreted. Thus, consistency can only be attained to a
certain degree no matter how well raters are trained and
how well designed the standardised questions are.
Same set of information, different recommendations Same set of information, different recommendations Same set of information, different recommendations Same set of information, different recommendations Same set of information, different recommendations?
Further questions arise in light of the actual performance
itself. If a programme performs well, does this mean that it
should receive more funds or does it rather show that it is
sufficiently equipped with resources? Ceteris paribus, if
performance is poor does this mean that the project itself
is not worth pursuing or does this rather show that it needs
to be redesigned and/or needs more funding in order to
succeed? Faction further occurs when funding for
underperforming programmes is granted on the grounds
of politically pragmatic stakeholder concerns. Although
performance is poor, funding in this case would increase
stakeholders’ trust for future projects (see Moynihan 2005:
166). Then again, if underperforming programmes get
more funding there are no incentives for actors to create
better performance. Moreover, performance information
cannot solve problems with
regards to the programme
priority. What is the basis for
the trade-off between pro-
gramme A in favour of
programme B? In addition,
what if the target group does
not benefit from the pro-
gramme but from others?
Should the performance
therefore be considered as
poor although it had some
very useful side-effects?
Further problems are associ-
ated with the choice and operationalisation of performance
indicators. In fact, it is probably impossible to have good
performance indicators for each operational goal. For
example, for the operational goal of having more citizens
choosing a healthy lifestyle, the performance indicators
can vary from the percentage of non-smokers, percentage
of citizens practising sports, to the level of obesity and
citizens eating healthy food (but how should eating healthy
food be measured?). As Curristine (2005: 97) puts it:
“The fact that countries continue to struggle with these
challenges [setting clear objectives and designing measures]
[…] reflects that it takes time to develop meaningful measures
and to collect relevant data of sufficient quality. Furthermore,
the revising and updating of performance measures is a
continuous process because needs and priorities are
constantly evolving.”
However, because in most countries, indicators are
therefore reviewed and possibly changed on an annual
basis (as it is, for instance, the case in the Netherlands),
there might be a time gap between intended goals of a
funding programme and the indicators that have changed
over time.
All the preceding examples point to reasons why actors
may interpret the same set of information differently and
why they consequently can make different recommendations
on the ground of logical arguments for either option
(Moynihan 2005). It also illustrates why legislators may not
necessarily change their behaviour given that optimising
“the linkage between performance and budgeting remains
unsolved” (Diamond 2003: 6). It becomes clear that there
is in fact no systemic relationship between performance
information and decision-making. Indeed, recent studies
suggest that the legislature has not substantially or even
weakly responded to performance information and reporting
(Johnson and Talbot 2007). Sterck (2007: 189) concludes
that the “performance initiatives [...] have a dominant focus
on changing the budget structure, but do not seem very
successful in altering the budget function”.
In addition, performance information and data as such
do not say anything about why performance occurred, how
the implementation worked and if external factors have
influenced the outcome. With reference to the OECD
countries, Curristine (2005: 90) summarises: “there is
considerable experience with outputs, but less with outcomes
although it is developing.” In order to make sense of the
reasons for failure/success of programmes, the information
has to be contextualised. Yet, because performance
budgeting needs to be contextualised, it is evident that
many other factors – such as the political system and the
fiscal environment – may play a pivotal role for a programme
to succeed. It is therefore no surprise that the success of
performance-based budget-
ing indeed varies from
country to country and in
some the outcome has been
very disappointing.7 Per-
formance information has
to be complemented by ex
post evaluations that focus
on attributes and causality
issues. Nevertheless, the
limited knowledge of the
means-ends linkages and
the utmost importance of
external factors (e.g. econo-
mic recessions) pose severe restrictions on the evaluation of
performance information. Put differently, the juxtaposition
of objectives and outputs neglects the relative importance
of other causal forces affecting outcomes in evidence.8
In short, because of the ambiguous linkage between
objectives, indicators and outputs, actors can make different
recommendations on the basis of the same set of
performance data. Performance information cannot
guarantee consensus and therefore, legislators do not
necessarily change their behaviour in accordance with the
performance scores.
Bounded rationality and information costs Bounded rationality and information costs Bounded rationality and information costs Bounded rationality and information costs Bounded rationality and information costs
Performance budgeting assumes that actors possess perfect
information. Performance budgeting thus hinges on rational
choice theory and is therefore open to the same criticism.
The policy/decision-makers may not have the capacity to
develop a coherent system of knowledge on the project
because performance information may simply be too
Performance information
has to be complemented by
ex post evaluations that
focus on attributes and
causality issues.
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complex or too time-consuming. Thus, actors may have to
use proxies other than performance information to reach a
decision because a “compre-
hensive use of performance
information is beyond limited
human capacities, leads to
information overload, and is
a distraction for policy
analysts“ (Moynihan 2005:
155). In addition, because
performance budgeting is
based on rational consider-
ations, it also suggests that
the creation of performance
budgeting is motivated by
the policy/decision-makers
self-interests to realise gains
from extrinsic incentives (i.e.
rewards and sanction).9 It
therefore neglects aspects of
result-based budgeting in the public sector that follow a
different logic, i.e. a logic that perceives the creation of
performance budgeting as an effort to follow norms. Thus,
bounded rationality, normative considerations and high
information costs pose strong limits and make it necessary
to reconsider the fundamental pillars of the system itself.
Critics of result-based budgeting refer to the potential
threat arising from imperfect information and/or an
incentive/sanction structure that leads to perverse outcomes.
In fact, they argue that performance budgeting is prone to
creating sub-optimal solutions. According to the opponents,
this is especially the case when the focus is put on quantity
rather than on quality. For example performance-based
budgeting in hospitals may operate with a system that
creates incentives (rewards) and (financial) sanctions on
the basis of the hospital’s success or failure in meeting the
output targets at a given cost. Further assume that this
hospital has to classify, for instance, all bone fracture
patients in the same group, regardless of whether elderly
patients cost the hospitals more than younger patients (cf.
Robinson and Brumby 2005). This can lead to perverse
incentives where hospitals either avoid treating elderly
bone fracture patients or are encouraging young patients
to undergo unnecessary – but for the hospital beneficial –
treatment (this dysfunctional behaviour and gaming is also
described as “skimping, dumping and creaming”).10 Another
example is the objective of higher A-level achievements met
by a lower standard of the A-level exams. Certainly, this “fit
for purpose” is a consequence of a target-driven mentality.
As Curristine (2005: 108) puts it:
“[t]here is always the danger that linking results to
financial resources can create incentives to distort and
cheat in presenting performance information. These are
problems that can be particularly acute when performance
information is not independently audited.”
In short, performance information runs the risk of
achieving sub-optimal/poor results because a wrong
incentive/sanction structure may create imperfect outcomes
and because the vast amount of information misspends
civil service energies. Government attempts to increase
programme efficiency by means of performance information
creates a target-driven mentality that is in itself anti-
democratic. By simply meeting the indicators to secure
further funding, local democratic decisions can be overruled
with a clear conscience. There are many important aspects
of funding programmes that are not and cannot be captured
by performance budgeting. These aspects may be normative
and intangible in nature (e.g.
projects that touch upon
human rights aspects) and
therefore very difficult (or
impossible) to operational-
ise and measure (Keenan
2000). For these program-
mes to succeed, targets may
well have unintended and
perverse effects. Indeed, it is
the focus on quantified
measures and the direct
performance budgeting that
encourage a wrong incen-
tive structure. Programmes
do not fail because they are
not measured. They fail
when public administrations
are not accountable, transparent and well run. Modernising
the public sector requires parallel steps into different
directions and politicians and officials first need to get the
basics right, i.e. they need to have tight input controls.11
Performance budgeting is appealing, however, it requires
major changes in the managerial culture and it depends to
a large extent on the political and professional commitment.
If the managerial conditions are poor and
“discourage performance, the budget will not be oriented
to performance. One implication of this hypothesis is that
it is futile to reform budgeting without first reforming the
overall managerial framework” (Schick 2003: 100).
Performance-based budgeting is “only one of the drivers
of change, and not always the most important one” (Schick
2003: 88). It should be clear that other factors, such as
effective leadership, reporting and audit systems are equally
important.
However, this is not to say that performance budgeting
is without any merits. Result-based budgeting has the
potential to usefully complement spending figures and
increase transparency. In fact, if the initial purpose of
performance budgeting is revisited and changed to a focus
on transparency rather than on the resource allocation of
performance programmes, then performance-based
budgeting may help to improve the budget process and
management.
Reconsidering the objectives Reconsidering the objectives Reconsidering the objectives Reconsidering the objectives Reconsidering the objectives
Given that the resource allocations on the basis of
programme performance remains a distant and even risky
undertaking, it is time to reconsider the initial objective of
performance-based budgeting. The original definition has
been challenged by different interpretations of the term
and practitioners as scholars are deeply divided over the
extent of the role played by performance budgeting in the
budget process. On the basis of the results of a recent
OECD survey, Curristine (2005; 2007) categorises perform-
ance budgeting in accordance with the use of performance
information in resources allocation. She distinguishes three
types of performance budgeting:
1) Presentational performance budgeting: There is no
formal mechanism to use performance information for
the allocation of resources to programmes that deliver
results. As is the case in Denmark, Sweden and Canada,
The policy/decision-makers
may not have the capacity
to develop a coherent
system of knowledge on
the project because
performance information
may simply be too complex
or too time-consuming.
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in this form of performance budgeting “performance
information is included, at best, as background
information only” (Curristine 2005: 102).
2) Performance informed budgeting: Performance
information is used along with other information in the
budget allocation process. In this form of performance
budgeting, resources are linked indirectly to results. This
implies that results “are being actively and systematically
used to inform budget decision”, however, performance
information “does not necessarily determine the amount
of resources allocated” (Curristine 2005: 102-03). The
UK, for instance, is loosely linking performance to
funding. In fact, the majority of OECD countries “engage
in performance informed budgeting – that is, the
performance data is used to inform but not determine
budget allocations” (Curristine 2005: 114).
3) Direct performance budgeting: Funding is directly related
to performance results. This form of performance
budgeting is very rare and applied only in a limited
number of sectors/countries (e.g. in Denmark, Sweden,
Hungary, Norway, Sweden and the UK, mainly in
higher education and/or health).12 However, it should
be noted that the OECD survey on performance
budgeting concludes: “performance information –
performance measures and evaluation – is rarely or
never used to eliminate programmes or cut expenditure,
or to reward agency heads”13 (Curristine 2005: 108).
The reason why underperforming programmes are not
eliminated is because most countries are using performance
informed budgeting (category 2). In fact, as stated above,
the use of performance information by the legislature,
executive and citizens is at best “patchy” (Pollitt 2006;
Johnson and Talbot 2007; Sterck 2007). “True” performance
budgeting is politically very hard to accomplished as
“politicians often have to turn the other cheek if managers
fail to perform according to expectations. They cannot
close down the department of education or sack thousands
of teachers” (Schick 2003: 90).
Nonetheless, this does not mean that no action at all is
taken. In most OECD countries, underperforming
programmes are then more closely monitored. The realistic
approach to performance budgeting is thus not to use it as
a system to link expenditure to programmes that deliver
result but to inform budget allocation and to use performance
information to signal underperforming programmes that
may need to be reviewed and monitored more carefully.
Despite the fact that performance budgeting has failed
to meet its initial objectives (category 3), it is not without any
merits. For example, performance information assists in
searching for alternative options for decision-making and
fosters the dialogue between the actors involved in a
common and unified framework. In addition, performance
information reduces uncertainty (but not necessarily
ambiguity). Performance budgeting addresses the main
shortcomings of the traditional budget such as the fact that
it is difficult to read for non-specialists, that it does not
indicate levels of efficiency, that it does not show the costs
by activity and that it does not link the resources to goals.
Performance budgeting has the potential to make
communication among and between departments and
parliament more meaningful and may support a focus on
essentials (i.e. a thinner policy agenda/budget articles) and
a higher quality of goal formulation. The most important
positive effect, however, is that performance budgeting
encourages more transparency given that unlike in the
traditional budget method, the costs for each activity are
clearly stated.14
To conclude, in questioning the effectiveness of
performance budgeting, it is essential to first ask for its
purpose. If the purpose is to directly link funding to
performance then performance budgeting has so far failed
to achieve its objective – in a sense, this is advantageous
given that direct performance budgeting is susceptible to
data manipulation and to creating perverse incentives. If
the purpose is not the allocation of resources in accordance
to performance but to increase transparency then
performance budgeting is a step into the right direction.
Thus, rather than discarding performance budgeting all
together, countries that have a fitting managerial framework
supported by a strong political commitment should evolve
their own performance approach.
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NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
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comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The standard
academic disclaimer applies concerning the author’s
responsibility of the opinions and statements in this article.
1 The OECD defines performance budgeting as “a form of
budgeting that relates funds allocated to measurable results“
(OECD 2003: 7).
2 In this paper the terms result-based budgeting, performance
budgeting, performance-based budgeting and performance-
informed budgeting are used interchangeably.
3 The incentive structure to motivate agencies may include
financial rewards and sanctions, the increase/decrease of
managers’ flexibility with regards to input controls and the
recognition of performance results by publicly identifying
good performance and naming and shaming underperformers
(e.g. league tables for schools, universities or hospitals).
4 It should be distinguished between outputs and outcomes.
Outputs refer to measures of productions, e.g. the number of
schools or kilometres of highways built. Outcomes refer to
measures of output impact, thus to the desired changes, e.g.
more pupils qualified for A-levels, less traffic jams and road
accidents. Outputs are therefore usually associated with
efficiency (the goods and services provided by the government)
while outcomes are linked to effectiveness (the impact of the
outputs on society). Certainly, it is easier to evaluate outputs
than outcomes.
5 Targets should be designed in accordance to the SMART
criteria, i.e. they should be Specific (is the target clear and to
the point?); Measurable (is the target measurable; are data
available?), Attainable (is the target realistic?); Relevant (is the
target a priority for the organisation?) and Tangible (is the
target time-bound; when should it be attained?).
6 It should be noted that it is possible to have performance
indicators without targets and instead use standards or baselines
(see for example the 2007 UK Public Sector Agreements (PSA).
7 It should be noted that most of the surveys on performance
budgeting have been conducted in the United States. For an
excellent review on the empirical literature see Robinson and
Brumby (2005). For a recent survey on performance budgeting
in OECD countries see Curristine (2005; 2007).
8 In the same vein, it would be a fallacy to infer that outputs and
outcomes are sufficient measures for government performance.
They  “are snapshots of what government is doing or
accomplishing at a particular time; they do not uncover the
factors that contribute to or retard the results, nor do they
indicate whether government will have the capacity to perform
in the future” (Schick 2003: 74).
9 For a fuller development of this point see Frey (1997).
10 Evidently, critics of performance-based budgeting therefore
repeatedly refer to the experience of Soviet central planning,
where, for example, “the nail factory […] found it was easier
to achieve its annual production target – which was specified
in weight terms – by producing absurdly large and unusable
nails” (Robinson and Brumby 2005: 16).
11 Thus, performance-based budgeting is not a panacea and
may even be a risky tool for countries in transition that are just
moving away from detailed line item classifications to a
programme basis. For a discussion on the effects of complex
performance regimes on transition and development countries
see Schick (1998).
12 In the UK, for example, universities receive funding in
accordance to their score in the Research Assessment Exercise
(RAE) that evaluates academic departments every five years on
the basis of students graduated, number of students per
teacher, number of books and impact-point relevant articles
published by the staff. Denmark, Finland and Sweden use a
formula where the number of graduated students release
funding for universities (cf. Curristine 2005: 103-05).
13 Indeed, 96% of the OECD countries rarely or never eliminated
poor or underperforming programmes.
14 For an opposing view see Sterck (2007).
○
○
○
○
R
e
w
a
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
W
i
n
n
e
r
s
,
 
P
u
n
i
s
h
 
t
h
e
 
L
o
s
e
r
s
R
e
w
a
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
W
i
n
n
e
r
s
,
 
P
u
n
i
s
h
 
t
h
e
 
L
o
s
e
r
s
R
e
w
a
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
W
i
n
n
e
r
s
,
 
P
u
n
i
s
h
 
t
h
e
 
L
o
s
e
r
s
R
e
w
a
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
W
i
n
n
e
r
s
,
 
P
u
n
i
s
h
 
t
h
e
 
L
o
s
e
r
s
R
e
w
a
r
d
 
t
h
e
 
W
i
n
n
e
r
s
,
 
P
u
n
i
s
h
 
t
h
e
 
L
o
s
e
r
s
?